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So far no existing study has analyzed what determines people’s trust in the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the WTO even though – in the absence of democratic accountability – this is one 
of the few ways to assess the legitimacy of these institutions. This study is intended to fill 
this gap in the literature based on Eurobarometer survey data from the EU-15 countries. 
The estimation results suggest that individual characteristics (gender, international 
background, formal education level, personal income, ideological preferences, interest in 
politics, and exposure to media) as well as the extent of globalization influence trust in the 
three international organizations. The state of the economy only has a significant effect on 
trust in the WTO. Moreover, respondents’ attitudes towards globalization have a bearing on 
trust in all three international organizations. Survey items on individual knowledge and 
perceptions of the WTO allow us to test additional hypotheses that apply to this institution 
alone. We find that familiarity with the WTO fosters trust. Finally, beliefs that the EU is 
well-represented in the WTO, that the WTO has a good reputation and that it is a 
democratic and necessary institution increases repondents’ propensity to trust the WTO. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last six decades, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO, until 1994 GATT) have expanded their mandates, revised 
their objectives, and achieved almost global coverage in terms of membership. At the same 
time, these three international economic organizations (IEOs)1 are highly contested. Nobel 
prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz notes that “International bureaucrats – the faceless symbols of 
the world economic order – are under attack everywhere. (…) Virtually every major meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization is 
now the scene of conflict and turmoil.” (2002, p. 3). 
 The criticism levelled at the three IEOs has different sources. First, they are criticized 
for their contribution to the acceleration of globalization.2 Riots and violent demonstrations 
at the G8 summit in Seattle in November 1999 (also known as “The Battle of Seattle”) bear 
testimony to the fact that the ongoing international integration of markets creates concerns 
about increasing inequality and irreversible environmental damage. Given that the Bank and 
the Fund urged countries worldwide to open up their markets as a precondition for financial 
assistance, these two organizations are blamed for negative side effects of globalization.3 
The WTO’s explicit connection to globalization is its official function to supervise and 
liberalize international trade by providing a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade 
agreements and resolving trade disputes.4  
 Second, the IMF and the World Bank are reproached with not having fulfilled their 
missions. Today’s main objective of the Bank is the implementation of long-run 
development programs, whereas the Fund’s responsibility is short-run macroeconomic 
stability.5 Their failure to alleviate worldwide poverty and to create stability may have 
different reasons. First of all, it may be due to an unfortunate choice of policies given a lack 
of knowledge about the countries involved. The finding that IMF policies do not promote 
growth (Vreeland, 2003) is explained by Stiglitz with the imposition of unsuitable policies 
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 The Bank and the Fund are also often denoted as the international financial institutions (IFIs). 
2
 For a more detailed overview of this literature see Milner (2005). 
3
 The preconditions for financial assistance are related to the term ”Washington Consensus” first used by 
John Williamson (1989) to summarize commonly shared themes of policy advice (fiscal discipline, trade 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization) by Washington-based institutions.  
4
 There are empirical studies, which, however, do not find a significant effect of GATT/WTO membership 
(Rose 2004) or World Bank/IMF policies (Boockmann and Dreher 2003) on measures of trade policy or 
liberalization, even though it ”seems safe to say that most economists think that the GATT has been at least 
moderately successful in liberalizing trade.” (Rose 2004, p. 211). 
5
 Note that there is often overlap in this division of objectives (see Marchesi and Sartori, 2011). 
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on the LDCs by IMF officials, while Easterly (2001) critically reviews how the Bank has 
managed development and globalization with its allegedly simple panaceas.  
 Another explanation for the failure of the two IFIs is that they were not designed 
exclusively or primarily to help poor or unstable countries but rather to covertly achieve 
ends that benefit rich countries. These allegations are based on the fact that influence at the 
Bank and the Fund depends on economic size; the US, the UK, Japan, Germany and France 
hold 40% of the votes, while the remainder is divided among about 180 countries. In 
particular, Bhagwati (2004) and Stiglitz (2002) have criticized the IMF for urging 
developing countries to open their capital markets to the world given that there is little, if 
any, evidence in favor of a growth-promoting effect of this policy prescription. What has 
been observed instead according to these critics is that the consequences of this “market 
fundamentalist” ideology have adversely affected poor countries, while private investors in 
rich countries have prospered. Moreover, recent empirical studies confirm the suspicion that 
the IMF and the World Bank use financial assistance packages to provide money to 
governments who are temporarily endowed with a seat in the UN Security council (Dreher, 
Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a,b) in order for them to vote in favor of the interests of the IFIs’ 
major shareholders. 
 The more traditional research on explanations for the failure of the IFIs argues from 
a principal-agent perspective and emphasizes internal organization problems. Vaubel (1986; 
1996) as one of the main proponents of this approach provides evidence that concerns about 
career prospects and the maximization of budgets motivate actors within these institutions to 
make loans and provide aid to countries in need and to focus less on monitoring the 
outcomes. A final point of criticism, which applies to international organizations in general, 
is the lack of democratic control.6  
 The absence of democratic accountability is our main motivation to investigate 
citizens’ trust in the three IEOs since this in turn implies that a lack of trust undermines the 
legitimacy of these institutions (Kaltenthaler et al. 2010, Rohrschneider 2002).  
Based on the sources of income of the two IFIs, there is a second motivation to 
analyze the public’s trust in these two organizations in particular. First, the financial 
contribution that each country makes to the Bank and the Fund depends on its economic size 
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 Frey and Stutzer (2006a,b) and Tullock (2006) put forward an innovative proposal to reduce this democratic 
deficit by means of a lottery selection of a large group of trustees who can vote on the ground rules of IOs as 
well as certain agenda items. 
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similar to the way in which the vote shares are determined.7 As a result, the two IFIs are 
mainly financed by taxpayers in the EU-15 countries.8 If these taxpayers, however, do not 
trust these organizations, the legitimacy of this financing arrangement is undermined. 
Second, with regard to the IMF one should bear in mind its vulnerability to the willigness of 
borrowing countries to accept the Fund’s loans. To give an example, in the wake of the 
Asian crisis, the IMF stepped up its conditionality requirements leading to warnings by IMF 
insiders and sympathetic outsiders to reduce conditionality (Fang and Stone 2011). By early 
2008 the IMF was left virtually without borrowers leading to a ten percent staff reduction. 
To summarize, it is in the interest of the Bank and the Fund to maintain the public’s trust to 
ensure and legitimize a steady flow of income to finance their operations. 
The final reason why we study the public’s trust in the three IEOs is based on the fact 
that one of the main functions of international organizations is the provision of information 
(Krueger 1998; Milner 2005). In this context, trust is indispensable to successfully persuade 
national policymakers and voters. 
  Our objective is to investigate what shapes individual (performance-based) trust in 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO with regard to their ability to get the effects of 
globalization under control. Notably, the determinants of trust in the three IEOs have so far 
not been analyzed in the literature, even though there are a few related studies. Edwards 
(2009) is a first important contribution based on data from the 2004 Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey in 44 developing countries. His main finding is that people’s evaluation of the 
economy has the largest explanatory power for the joint support of the three IEOs, while 
individual characteristics such as gender and education level also have a statistically 
significant influence. 
 On the other hand, there are contributions that examine the determinants of trust in 
other international organizations. Torgler (2008) is the first study that extends the vast 
literature on social capital to a sub-branch of international trust, i.e. trust in one particular 
international organization. He investigates the determinants of trust in the UN across 38 
countries based on the third wave of the World Values Survey (1995/96) and finds that trust 
in the UN is affected by age, political interest, marital and employment status, relative 
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 Each member country is granted a quota that determines its influence. From this quota (dependent on 
economic size), a complicated calculation determines the country's voting power: based on a fixed part of 
250 votes and a part that is proportional to its quota. 
8
 According to Driscoll (1996) the IMF can be viewed as a credit union almost entirely financed by member 
countries’ quota subscriptions, whereas the World Bank’s resources are mainly borrowed from the 
international bond market. Member countries’ contributions only make up about 10% of the Bank’s total 
budget. 
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income, religiosity, social and political trust, geographic identification, corruption, and 
globalization.  
 Moreover, there are studies that analyze the determinants of individual or aggregate 
trust in the European Central Bank. In this case, it is quite clear from the outset what the 
objective and the resulting evaluation criterion for the ECB is, namely control over inflation. 
Fischer and Hahn (2008) use aggregated data for 12 EU countries over a time period of 6 
years and find that macroeconomic variables (inflation, GDP, unemployment benefits) 
influence trust in the ECB. Roth et al. (2011) provide evidence that public debt, inflation, 
and unemployment have an influence on trust in the ECB only in crisis periods, while 
Ehrmann et al. (2010) conclude that in crisis and non-crisis periods trust in the ECB are in 
the same way affected by macroeconomic performance. Finally, Kalthenthaler et al. (2010) 
find that on an individual level the perceived democratic deficit and a lack of knowledge are 
the best predictors of distrust in the ECB. The influence of familiarity with the ECB on trust 
is confirmed by Ehrmann et al. (2010). 
 This study extends the above literature in various ways. First, the focus is on the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO which makes it is easier to identify the purpose and 
goals of these institutions than for a vast institution such as the UN with many sub-
organizations.9 Second, compared to Edwards (2009), our data allows us to separately 
investigate trust in the three organizations, whereas in his case people were asked about their 
joint opinion on the three IEOs.10 Third, unlike Edwards (2009) and Torgler (2008) our data 
focuses on respondents from the EU-15 countries. This can be viewed as a disadvantage due 
to less cross-country heterogeneity or as an advantage as people in the EU may be more 
objective regarding the IMF’s and the World Bank’s activities which are concentrated in 
non-EU countries. In any case, it is an aspect in which our study differs from the existing 
investigations. Fourth, our study contains additional survey items that allow us to test novel 
hypotheses on the determinants of institutional trust.  
 The estimation results based on data from a Eurobarometer survey in 2001 across the 
EU-15 countries suggest that individual characteristics (gender, international background, 
formal education level, personal income, ideological preferences, interest in politics, and 
exposure to media) as well as the extent of globalization significantly affect trust in the 
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 In particular, Torgler (2008, p. 89) argues that ”The complex nature of the UN requires a multidimensional 
approach to fully understand the level of trust in such an international institution.” 
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More specifically, people were asked “Is the influence of international organizations like the IMF, World 
Bank and World Trade Organization very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in (survey 
country)?”. 
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IEOs. Moreover, people seem to project negative attitudes towards globalization to their 
level of trust in the three IEOs. Finally, the inclusion of additional survey items on 
individual perceptions of the WTO bring to light additional insights: trust in the WTO is 
shaped by beliefs that the EU is well-represented in the WTO, that the WTO has a good 
reputation, and that the WTO is a democratic and necessary institution. Finally, familiarity 
with the WTO increases respondents’ propensity to trust this international organization. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 puts forward a number 
of hypotheses on factors that shape people’s trust in the three IEOs. Section 3 describes the 
data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5 
concludes the analysis. 
 
2 Theoretical considerations 
2.1 Socio-economic/-demographic characteristics 
In a first step, this paper investigates how socio-economic and socio-demographic 
characteristics of respondents affect their trust in the three IEOs. Existing studies find that 
gender, age, income, and education affect generalized interpersonal trust. More specifically, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that men, older people, high-income earners and highly 
educated people express more trust towards other individuals, while marital status appears to 
be irrelevant. Similar results are presented by Glaeser et al. (2000).  
However, while Alesina and La Ferrara argue that income and education increase 
trust through a professional success channel, Glaeser et al. emphasize that educated 
individuals are more often surrounded by other educated and trustworthy. Furthermore, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) explain the finding that women are less likely to trust other 
people by pointing to the fact that women were historically discriminated against. In our 
case, where we investigate trust in the three IEOs, we put forward an additional channel for 
gender differences in trust propensities. In particular, we emphasize the substantial literature 
which argues that women are harmed by austerity measures backed by the IMF and World 
Bank (Emeagwali 1995; Sparr 1994).  
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 A study on international trust (Brewer et al. 2004) provides evidence for a negative 
influence of age and income on international trust11, while education has a positive influence 
on international trust. These results are at odds with the other two aforementioned studies on 
social trust, which may be due to the fact that international trust is differently determined by 
individual characteristics and that only respondents from the US were included in this study. 
 Torgler (2008) and Ehrmann et al. (2010) are most similar to our study as the 
investigate determinants of trust in an international organization based on micro-level data. 
Therefore, we expect that our results will be most strongly in line with their findings. 
Torgler finds that there is essentially an inversely U-shaped relationship between age and 
trust (he uses three age groups: 30-49, 50-64, 65+ and below 30 as the base level) in the UN, 
while gender, ideology and formal education are irrelevant. In contrast, political interest, 
income, employment and marital status have an influence on trust in the UN.12 In contrast, 
Ehrmann et al. (2010) who do not use the full set of dummies and do not control for relative 
income find that trust in the ECB is higher for men, married people and highly educated 
people as well as those with a centre-right political orientation, while age and employment 
status are insignificant. Hence, it appears that individual determinants of trust are 
organization-specific, which makes a prediction regarding the results for the three IEOs 
rather difficult. 
Our investigation includes additional individual characteristics, such as the 
internationality of respondents captured by a foreign background and the number of foreign 
languages well spoken. In a similar vein, Torgler uses a measure of geographic identification 
to test the hypothesis that people who are less connected to the international community may 
be skeptical about the purpose of international organizations. Furthermore, while Torgler 
finds ideological preferences to be irrelevant for trust in the UN, there is reason to believe 
that ideological orientation is more likely to matter for trust in the three IEOs than the UN, 
as especially the Bank and the Fund are associated with neoliberal policies (Williamson, 
1989). Therefore, left-wing voters should be less inclined to express trust in the three IEOs.  
Moreover, in order to measure political interest, we include survey items on how 
frequently individuals follow the news on TV, in the newspaper, and the radio, what kind of 
                                                 
11
 International trust is measured with answers to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that the 
United States can trust other nations, or that the United States can’t be too careful in dealing with other 
nations? Would you say that most of the time other nations try to be helpful to the United States, or that they 
are just looking out for themselves?”. 
12
Torgler (2008) also provides evidence for a number of additional individual characteristics, which we cannot 
include in our analysis as these items were not included in the Eurobarometer survey 55.1. This includes risk 
aversion, church attendance, and geographic identification. 
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domains of news they are most interested in (politics, social issues, EU, economy, sports, 
environment, international affairs, and culture) and how frequently they are involved in 
political discussions and try to convince friends of a certain opinion. We assume that the 
latter are even better measures for political interest as they involve an active role for the 
respondent. Finally, we include dummies in order to capture whether respondents live in a 
rural area/village, a small-/medium sized town or a large town. Our conjecture is that people 
in large cities have a more international mindset, are more sympathetic to international 
political endeavors, and may therefore have a higher propensity to trust the three IEOs. To 
summarize, our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1:  Trust in the three IEOs is affected by respondents’ socio-economic/-demographic 
characteristics. 
 
2.2 Attitudes towards globalization 
This paper in addition puts forward the hypothesis that people project negative opinions 
about globalization on their extent of trust in the three IEOs since these organizations have 
been strongly involved in the acceleration of globalization (see introduction). In particular, 
we make use of ten survey items that measure attitudes towards globalization. These will be 
discussed in further detail in the next chapter (for a summary see table 5 in the appendix). 
Hypothesis 2 states: 
 
H2:  Trust in the three IEOs is influenced by respondents’ attitudes towards globalization. 
 
This second hypothesis has so far not been tested in any existing study. 
 
2.3 Specific perceptions about IEOs 
A more direct way to test how individual attitudes shape trust in the three IEOs is to rely on 
survey items that capture people’s views of international organizations. In the 
Eurobarometer survey 55.1 such items are included, however, only with respect to the WTO. 
People were asked about the extent to which they know or have heard of the WTO and 
afterwards they were confronted with nine statements on the WTO; respondents were asked 
whether they tend to agree or disagree with each of them. We hypothesize that knowledge 
about an international organization fosters trust and that negative perceptions regarding the 
9 
workings of an IEO and the way it handles its everyday tasks translate into a lower level of 
institutional trust. When people were asked whether they have heard of the WTO before the 
interview, they could answer on a scale from 1 to 5. This allows us to test more thoroughly 
Ehrmann et al.’s (2010) and Kaltenthaler et al.’s (2010) conjecture that knowledge of an 
international organization fosters trust13, while extending it to the three IEOs. Hypothesis 3 
can be summarized as: 
 
H3:  Trust in the WTO is influenced by knowledge of the WTO and positive attitudes 
towards this international organization. 
 
Among the three IEOs analyzed in this paper, the WTO is the “youngest” one, as it evolved 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994. Moreover, due to “its 
small size and uncertain place as an economic institution” (Rose 2004, p.211), it is 
particularly interesting to what extent people say that they do not trust this institution simply 
because they do not know much about it.14 Moreover, the WTO has the most narrow and 
most easily definable task of the three IEOs (facilitation of trade liberalization), which 
should make it easier for the public to judge whether they agree or disagree with certain 
statements regarding the WTO’s performance. 
 
2.4 Macroeconomic variables 
There is mounting evidence that institutional trust is affected by country-level variables. 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) illustrate in a recent contribution that both within the US as 
well as on a cross-country level people’s trust in public institutions such as the government, 
the private sector, the judiciary, and the press are significantly determined by the business 
cycle, which is in their case measured by the unemployment rate.  
Roth et al. (2011) and Ehrmann et al. (2010) focus on the ECB and find that various 
macroeconomic variables influence trust in this institution. Torgler also provides evidence 
on the economic performance – trust in international institutions nexus. He explains his 
findings for trust in the UN as follows (2008, p.88): “People who are cynical about domestic 
politics are also more cynical about international institutions. Citizens who believe that their 
own government does not fulfill their expectations may reason that international bodies may 
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 In both studies, due to data availability only a 0-1 scaling of knowledge about the ECB was employed. 
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 Vaubel et al. (2007) provide data on staff size across 27 international organizations and report that in 2001 
staff size of the WTO only amounted to 368 compared to 6,800 and 2,976 for the Bank and the Fund. 
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be even less able to satisfy their preferences.” We extend this reasoning to the three IEOs 
with the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  Trust in the three IEOs is affected by the state of the economy (low unemployment 
and inflation) in the country that respondents live in. 
 
One of the macro-level variables that Torgler (2008) includes is the KOF-globalization 
index (see Dreher, 2006) which is a multi-dimensional globalization measure based on 23 
variables from the economic, political, and social sphere. He provides evidence that people 
who live in more politically, economically, and socially integrated countries are more likely 
to trust international organizations such as the UN. Torgler (2008, p. 69) describes the 
underlying theory as follows: “Countries’ capacity to act globally by creating international 
networks guaranteeing information, goods and capital flows increase the demand for 
international stability and the avoidance of a dangerous international environment. A safe 
environment guarantees that the international network is maintained. Such conditions may 
foster trust in international organizations as the UN.” An alternative explanation, which we 
put forward, states that people who live in a more globalized country are more exposed to 
foreign cultures, products, and people. Therefore, they may have less nationalistic views and 
may be more willing to rely on international organizations.  To summarize: 
 
H5:  Trust in the three IEOs is influenced by the extent to which the country that 
respondents live in is economically, politically, and socially integrated with the rest 
of the world. 
 
These hypotheses form the basis for the empirical analysis presented in section 4. We seek 
to investigate how people’s identity and background (H1), the economic environment that 
people live in (H4 and H5), and specific perceptions regarding the WTO or globalization 
(H2 and H3) influence trust in international organizations. The next section first describes 
the variables and the survey items in more detail and afterwards explains the empirical 
strategy. 
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3 Data and model specification 
3.1 Data description 
The dataset contains data for 9,014 respondents from the EU-15 countries collected in a 
survey that was conducted in April/May 2001. It is denoted as no. 55.1 of the Eurobarometer 
(EB) Survey Series. The sample of respondents for each Eurobarometer Survey is drawn 
based on a multi-stage, random probability procedure in order to give a representative 
picture of the population aged fifteen years and over in the EU member states. The 
interviews are organized bi-annually (in spring and in autumn) by research firms on behalf 
of the European Commission and are conducted in a face-to-face setting in people’s homes 
and in the respective national language.  
The dependent variable that measures trust in the three IEOs is closely related to the 
IEO’s performance regarding the task of managing the effects of globalization. More 
specifically, the questionnaire item is worded as follows: “Globalization is a general 
opening up of all economies, which leads to the creation of a truly world-wide market. From 
the following list, who do you trust most to get the effects of globalization under control?”15 
In addition to the three IEOs, the list of variables from which respondents can select 
multiple answers includes the national government, the EU, NGOs, ecological movements, 
trade unions, consumer rights associations, multinational companies, churches, the UN, the 
US government, citizens themselves, others, and noone. 
 Figure 1 displays what share of the respondents in each of the EU-15 countries 
mentioned the three IEOs as one of the institutions that are most trusted to get the effects of 
globalization under control. The first fact that is striking about these averages is that only 
about 5% of respondents in Portugal express trust in any of the three IEOs. In other 
countries, the values are similarly low with about 7% to 8% in Spain, in Italy 7% to 12%, in 
Greece 6% to 8%, and in France 7% to 14%. The highest values are recorded in Sweden 
where 27.4%, 46.6%, and 29.9% trust the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, respectively. 
Other countries that are to be found at the upper end of the cross-country distribution of trust 
in the three IEOs are the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Germany. Hence, we can state 
that on average Scandinavian respondents express more trust in the three IEOs than 
Southern European citizens. 
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 Note that due to data availability as regards our dependent variables, our study is based on data from one 
Eurobarometer survey only. 
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 If we aggregate the responses of all respondents across countries, we find that 
European citizens do not seem to trust the three IEOs very much. In fact, as the summary 
statistics in table 6 in the appendix reveal, only 14.6%, 20%, and 22.4% of the respondents 
trust the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, respectively. To put these aggegated levels of 
institutional trust into perspective, it is helpful to review the percentages of respondents that 
express trust in national and international institutions in other studies.16 
 
Fig. 1. Percentages of respondents that trust the three IEOs across the EU-15 countries, 2001 
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Source: Eurobarometer survey 55.1 (April/May 2001) 
 
As regards European citizens’ trust in the ECB, Kalthenthaler et al. (2010) report that 
between 38% (France) and 70% (Netherlands) of respondents expressed trust in the ECB in 
a Eurobarometer survey in 2006. Ehrmann et al. (2010) report a decline in trust in the ECB 
from about 50% of the respondents in the pre-2008 period down to about 35% in 2009, 
while Roth et al. (2011) add one additional year of data showing that after a temporary 
increase trust in the ECB decreased again due to the ongoing debt crisis. With respect to 
trust in national institutions, Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) observe that about 30% to 50% 
of respondents express quite a lot of confidence17 in banks, the Supreme Court, newspapers, 
congress, and big business until the mid-2000s. Hudson (2006) reports that in 2001 EU 
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 Unfortunately, Torgler (2008) does not provide summary statistics. 
13 
citizens’ trust in the UN amounts to 55.1%, while 45.2%, 44.1%, and 69.1% trust the 
government, unions, and the police. To conclude, trust in the three IEOs is comparatively 
much lower than trust in national institutions as well as other international institutions such 
as the UN and the ECB. 
Another notable fact about figure 1 is that in some countries the extent of trust across 
the three IEOs is very similar (Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy), while in other countries 
there is a divergence across the three institutions (Sweden and Netherlands). Interestingly, in 
the Netherlands the World Trade Organization is the most trusted institution, while in 
Sweden it is the World Bank. These cross-country differences cannot be explained without 
further analysis. However, they underline the necessity to control for country-level variables 
or to include country fixed effects. Therefore, we include in our estimations the KOF-
globalization index as well as unemployment and inflation rates from the OECD Key 
Economic Indicators and the OECD Economic Outlook, respectively.  
Based on the considerations in section 2.1 we also include a number of control 
variables at the individual level in the regressions: gender, age, ideological preferences, 
relative income, marital status, education level, employment status, foreign background (i.e. 
mother tongue is different from native language), number of foreign languages in which the 
respondent is proficient, the frequency with which the respondent takes part in political 
discussions and tries to convince friends of his/her opinion, how frequently the respondent 
follows the news from different media sources (TV, newspaper or radio), what kind of news 
he/she is most interested in (politics, social issues, EU, economy, sports, environment, 
international affairs or culture), and his/her area of residence (rural area/village, small-
/medium-sized town or large town). 
Finally, we include twenty items that capture the respondent’s opinions about 
globalization, one item that measures how much he/she knows about the WTO, and nine 
items on his/her views about the WTO (see table 5 for details). Table 6 in the appendix 
provides summary statistics for all of the micro- and macro-level variables that are included 
in the regressions. 
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 Their dependent variable is scaled with ”very little” to ”some”, ”a great deal”, and ”quite a lot”. 
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3.2 Empirical strategy 
Since the dependent variables (trust in IMF, World Bank or WTO) assume the values 0 or 1, 
the estimations employ a binary probit estimator. The regression model can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
Trustic = α + βIndividualic + δOpinionsic +φCountryc+ εic,                                    (1) 
 
where the vector Individualic includes the socio-economic/-demographic characteristics of 
respondents and the vector Countryc includes the growth rate of the consumer price index 
(OECD Key Economic Indicators), unemployment rates (OECD Economic Outlook), and 
the KOF globalization index (based on data from the political, social, and economic sphere) 
or a set of country dummies instead. The subscript i refers to an individual respondent and c 
is the country index. 
In the case where we include macro-level variables, we are, of course, not able to 
include country dummies and have instead clustered the standard errors at the country level. 
Finally, Opinionsic includes thirty variables that capture respondents’ views about 
globalization or the WTO in specific as well as the extent of knowledge of the WTO. 
Section 4.1 reports the estimation results for the baseline estimations, whereas in section 4.2 
we display the results for a robustness check that involves an alternative scaling of the 
dependent variables.  
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline estimations 
In the first set of estimations summarized in table 1, we investigate the validity of hypothesis 
1, i.e. we are interested in individuals’ characteristics that influence trust in the three IEOs. 
In order to use the maximum number of observations in models 1 to 3, which differ in terms 
of the dependent variable, we only include those variables with no missing observations. In 
a second step, we add 15 individual-level variables in models 4 to 6, which leaves us with 
8,458 instead of 9,014 observations. Since the magnitude of coefficients in probit 
estimations cannot be interpreted, we have included the marginal effects in italics just below 
the z-statistics for all of the controls that are included in the estimations. 
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 The parsimonious specifications in models 1 to 3 provide evidence that men express 
a significantly higher propensity to trust the three IEOs than women. More specifically, the 
marginal effect at mean values shows that the probability to trust the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the WTO is 2.7%, 3.3%, and 1.6% higher for men than for women. With regard to age 
we find evidence for an inversely U-shaped relationship for trust in the IMF, while neither 
the linear nor the quadratic age term are significantly related to trust in the other two IEOs.  
Respondents with a foreign origin have a lower likelihood to trust the three IEOs by 
3.4% to 7.9%, while speaking an additional foreign language increases the likelihood to trust 
the three IEOs (2.4% to 2.9% more per language). These two findings can be rationalized by 
asserting that foreigners are generally less able to trust others since they may face 
discrimination in their everyday life, while speaking multiple languages might be associated 
with an international mindset and a better understanding of international political and 
economic endeavors. 
 Respondents’ marital and employment status are mostly irrelevant for the likelihood 
of trusting the three IEOs18, while on the other hand, individuals who were older than 19 
years when they finished their education have a 4.5% to 6.5% higher likelihood of trusting 
the three IEOs than individuals who finished their education at less than 16 years of age.19 
This effect goes beyond the income effect which reveals that being in a higher income 
quartile leads to 2.4% to 2.7% higher likelihood of trust in the three IEOs. Moreover, we 
find that right-wing voters have a 1.8% to 3.8% higher likelihood of trusting the three 
organizations compared to left-wing voters. In summary, individual characteristics have 
both a statistically as well as an economically significant effect on the willingness to trust 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 1 based on 
the estimation results for models 1 to 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Surprisingly, the ”married” dummy has a significantly negative coefficient in models 2 and 5. This would 
imply that married people are less likely to trust the three IEOs than single individuals. This is admittedly a 
somewhat puzzling result. However, with more complete specifications in tables 2 to 4, this effect appears 
less frequently and in table 4 it is even significantly positive for one model. Note that Torgler (2008) presents 
an even more significant negative coefficient for the ”married” dummy, which he only mentions briefly. 
19
 The dummy ”age till education: 16 to 19 years” is only significant in three out of six models. This implies 
that the final years of high school or possibly the first year at the university have less of an influence on trust 
in the three IEOs than an academic background. 
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Table 1 Individual determinants of trust in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, probit estimations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variable Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Demographic factors       
Male 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.057* 0.050 0.058 -0.010 
 (3.625) (3.841) (1.737) (1.204) (1.491) (-0.253) 
 0.027 0.033 0.016 0.010 0.015 -0.003 
Age 0.010 0.024*** -0.002 -0.003 0.017** -0.011* 
 (1.438) (3.569) (-0.366) (-0.430) (2.466) (-1.661) 
 0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 
Age^2 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 (-1.288) (-3.221) (0.203) (0.062) (-2.407) (1.210) 
 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
International background       
Foreigner -0.178** -0.205** -0.318*** -0.175* -0.178** -0.337*** 
 (-1.990) (-2.449) (-3.807) (-1.884) (-2.057) (-3.892) 
 -0.034 -0.048 -0.079 -0.032 -0.042 -0.083 
Foreign languages 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.067*** 0.085*** 0.051*** 
 (5.763) (5.884) (4.797) (3.156) (4.165) (2.588) 
 0.024 0.029 0.025 0.013 0.021 0.014 
Marital status       
Married -0.038 -0.108** 0.026 -0.065 -0.134*** 0.013 
 (-0.733) (-2.218) (0.554) (-1.219) (-2.648) (0.262) 
 -0.008 -0.028 0.007 -0.013 -0.035 0.004 
Divorced -0.025 -0.012 -0.015 -0.023 -0.020 -0.050 
 (-0.317) (-0.162) (-0.207) (-0.274) (-0.260) (-0.644) 
 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 
Separated -0.098 0.125 -0.006 -0.130 0.112 -0.021 
 (-0.604) (0.937) (-0.044) (-0.750) (0.806) (-0.150) 
 -0.019 0.034 -0.002 -0.024 0.030 -0.006 
Widowed -0.150 -0.111 -0.083 -0.159* -0.124 -0.060 
 (-1.616) (-1.352) (-1.037) (-1.647) (-1.446) (-0.712) 
 -0.029 -0.027 -0.023 -0.030 -0.030 -0.016 
Employment status       
Unemployed 0.019 -0.014 -0.024 0.030 -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.240) (-0.186) (-0.329) (0.351) (-0.062) (-0.164) 
 0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 
School 0.073 0.084 0.064 0.031 0.054 0.036 
 (0.931) (1.135) (0.918) (0.384) (0.711) (0.497) 
 0.015 0.022 0.018 0.006 0.014 0.010 
Retired 0.072 0.003 -0.029 0.086 0.008 -0.054 
 (1.085) (0.049) (-0.483) (1.239) (0.118) (-0.862) 
 0.015 0.001 -0.008 0.018 0.002 -0.015 
Home -0.036 0.043 -0.005 -0.013 0.072 0.021 
 (-0.500) (0.661) (-0.085) (-0.176) (1.063) (0.328) 
 -0.007 0.011 -0.001 -0.003 0.019 0.006 
Self-employed 0.108 0.014 0.026 0.109 0.020 0.003 
 (1.643) (0.222) (0.419) (1.616) (0.305) (0.049) 
 0.023 0.004 0.007 0.023 0.005 0.001 
Formal education till age       
16 to 19 yrs 0.053 0.084* 0.125*** 0.037 0.054 0.092* 
 (1.002) (1.759) (2.703) (0.678) (1.083) (1.911) 
 0.011 0.022 0.035 0.008 0.014 0.026 
>= 19 yrs 0.249*** 0.174*** 0.225*** 0.173*** 0.104* 0.147*** 
 (4.431) (3.328) (4.403) (2.930) (1.887) (2.730) 
 0.053 0.045 0.065 0.036 0.027 0.042 
Income quartiles       
Relative income 0.132*** 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.113*** 0.082*** 0.063*** 
 (6.962) (5.353) (4.993) (5.715) (4.464) (3.567) 
 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.018 
Political attitudes and interest      
Ideological preferences 0.044* 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.061** 0.060*** 0.079*** 
 (1.927) (2.666) (3.199) (2.545) (2.704) (3.648) 
 0.009 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.015 0.022 
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Political discussion -     0.098*** 0.084*** 0.060* 
frequency    (2.822) (2.611) (1.931) 
    0.020 0.021 0.017 
Political discussion -     0.006 -0.014 0.048** 
convince friends    (0.284) (-0.731) (2.533) 
    0.001 -0.004 0.013 
Use of news sources       
Television use - news    0.016 -0.022 0.000 
    (0.630) (-0.993) (0.007) 
    0.003 -0.006 0.000 
Daily newspapers use - news    0.035** 0.036** 0.012 
    (2.111) (2.327) (0.826) 
    0.007 0.009 0.003 
Radio use - news    0.023 -0.013 0.002 
    (1.611) (-0.998) (0.187) 
    0.005 -0.003 0.001 
News interests       
Attention to news: politics    0.076* 0.024 0.075** 
    (1.927) (0.644) (2.119) 
    0.015 0.006 0.021 
Attention to news: social     0.043 0.020 0.020 
issues    (1.090) (0.557) (0.562) 
    0.009 0.005 0.006 
Attention to news:     0.061* 0.078** 0.091*** 
European Union    (1.734) (2.359) (2.839) 
    0.012 0.020 0.025 
Attention to news: economy    0.082** 0.055* 0.032 
    (2.423) (1.794) (1.059) 
    0.017 0.014 0.009 
Attention to news: sport    -0.006 0.031 -0.001 
    (-0.261) (1.334) (-0.052) 
    -0.001 0.008 -0.000 
Attention to news:     -0.039 0.033 0.007 
environment    (-1.115) (1.018) (0.218) 
    -0.008 0.008 0.002 
Attention to news:     0.120*** 0.040 0.039 
International affairs    (3.387) (1.198) (1.220) 
    0.024 0.010 0.011 
Attention to news: culture    -0.018 -0.030 0.026 
    (-0.559) (-1.042) (0.919) 
    -0.004 -0.008 0.007 
Area of residence       
Rural area or village    -0.032 0.023 0.057 
    (-0.669) (0.506) (1.306) 
    -0.006 0.006 0.016 
Small-/medium-sized town    -0.016 -0.021 0.005 
    (-0.372) (-0.494) (0.135) 
    -0.003 -0.005 0.002 
Pseudo R^2 0.091 0.112 0.090 0.110 0.120 0.103 
Observations 9014 9014 9014 8458 8458 8458 
a
 Marginal effects at mean values of explanatory variables are in italics, z-statistics are in parentheses. b Hypotheses tests are based on 
robust standard errors. c All estimations include country fixed effects. d Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). e Base levels for 
dummy variables: female, single, employed, education until age < 15 years, native (i.e. national language is mother tongue), living in a 
large town. Ideological preferences defined as−1 (left-wing), 0 (center), +1 (right-wing); relative income scaled as 1 (lowest income 
quartile) to 4 (highest quartile). 
 
Models 4 to 6 allow us to draw some additional conclusions with regard to characteristics of 
individuals in the EU-15 countries that are associated with trust in the three IEOs. To begin 
with, the estimations in the last three columns in table 1 provide evidence that more frequent 
involvement in political discussions, which can be viewed as an expression of political 
interest, is positively associated with trust in the three IEOs, while the willingness to 
convince friends of one’s own political opinions is only significant in model 5 with trust in 
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the World Bank as the dependent variable. Moreover, it appears that individuals who read 
the newspaper are more likely to trust the IMF and the World Bank. This can be explained 
by pointing out that people who read the newspaper on a regular basis have a better 
understanding of the IFIs’ objectives and the policies that they pursue to achieve them. 
 Moreover, models 4 to 6 provide evidence that people who are interested in news 
from the domains of politics, the EU, the economy, and international affairs are more likely 
to trust the three IEOs even though the pattern of significance differs between the three 
models. Finally, it appears that the area of residence of the respondent, i.e. a rural versus an 
urban environment, is irrelevant to the propensity to trust the three IEOs. It should also be 
noted that the gender dummy is insignificant in models 4 to 6. This may be due to the fact 
that gender is multicollinear with news interests, political interests, and ideological 
orientations. 
 Table 2 extends the analysis in table 1 by including a number of variables that 
capture respondents’ views about globalization and the WTO. By doing so, we test the 
validity of hypotheses 2 and 3 concerning the question whether particular opinions of the 
three IEOs and knowledge about the WTO influences the likelihood of trust. Model 7 to 9 
include ten variables on individuals’ views about globalization, models 10 to 12 includes ten 
additional opinions on globalization, while models 13 and 14 focus solely on the 
determinants of trust in the WTO and use one item on the level of knowledge about the 
WTO and nine items on opinions of the WTO. 
 First, it should be noted that the signs and the levels of significance for the individual 
controls in the upper part of table 2 are very similar to table 1. With regard to respondents’ 
attitudes towards globalization, it becomes evident that certain opinions on globalization are 
obviously projected unto the level of trust expressed for the three IEOs. While the 
impression that globalization leads to a more peaceful world, more integrated global markets 
and lower product prices is positively associated with trust in the WTO, the idea that 
globalization guarantees the EU greater economic presence in the world is positively 
correlated with trust in the IMF and WTO.  
Moreover, people who have the impression that globalization provides more 
opportunities for selling national products on world markets express more trust in all three 
IEOs. Finally, those who believe that globalization makes it more difficult to control the 
quality of food products express a lower likelihood of trust in the IMF, while those who 
agree that globalization cannot be controlled by national governments are less likely to trust 
the WTO.  
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Table 2 Further individual determinants of trust in IMF, World Bank, and WTO, probit estimations 
 Model  
7 
Model  
8 
Model  
9 
Model 
10 
Model  
11 
Model  
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Dependent variable Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
WTO 
Demographic factors        
Male 0.104** 0.145*** 0.062 0.142*** 0.176*** 0.054 -0.075 0.047 
 (2.107) (3.063) (1.343) (2.738) (3.550) (1.132) (-1.286) (0.794) 
 0.025 0.041 0.019 0.034 0.050 0.017 -0.026 0.016 
Age 0.017* 0.021** -0.004 0.004 0.018* -0.011 -0.005 0.000 
 (1.744) (2.252) (-0.416) (0.400) (1.880) (-1.249) (-0.437) (0.041) 
 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 
Age^2 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.224) (-2.026) (0.425) (-0.375) (-1.643) (1.154) (0.456) (0.026) 
 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
International background        
Foreigner -0.292** -0.490*** -0.329*** -0.203 -0.387*** -0.333*** -0.317** -0.314** 
 (-2.344) (-3.912) (-2.777) (-1.594) (-3.072) (-2.718) (-2.061) (-2.040) 
 -0.063 -0.116 -0.092 -0.045 -0.097 -0.094 -0.100 -0.098 
Foreign languages 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.082*** 0.062** 0.089*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.063** 
(3.338) (4.073) (3.328) (2.216) (3.292) (2.634) (2.908) (2.113) 
 0.021 0.029 0.025 0.015 0.026 0.022 0.030 0.021 
Marital status         
Married -0.064 -0.081 0.076 -0.102 -0.153** -0.064 0.036 0.002 
 (-0.910) (-1.197) (1.179) (-1.382) (-2.157) (-0.956) (0.437) (0.029) 
 -0.016 -0.023 0.023 -0.025 -0.045 -0.020 0.012 0.001 
Divorced -0.030 0.094 -0.023 -0.037 -0.005 -0.026 0.006 0.020 
 (-0.277) (0.904) (-0.220) (-0.330) (-0.048) (-0.243) (0.047) (0.158) 
 -0.007 0.028 -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.007 
Separated -0.050 0.225 0.263 -0.279 -0.127 -0.145 0.215 0.045 
 (-0.213) (1.109) (1.365) (-1.090) (-0.587) (-0.736) (0.869) (0.174) 
 -0.012 0.069 0.089 -0.059 -0.035 -0.043 0.078 0.015 
Widowed -0.219 -0.159 0.052 -0.248* -0.113 0.002 -0.046 -0.064 
 (-1.642) (-1.282) (0.443) (-1.742) (-0.878) (0.014) (-0.319) (-0.422) 
 -0.048 -0.042 0.016 -0.054 -0.031 0.001 -0.015 -0.021 
Employment status        
Unemployed 0.212* -0.094 0.160 0.202* -0.031 0.162 0.061 0.130 
 (1.892) (-0.820) (1.540) (1.717) (-0.267) (1.511) (0.477) (0.999) 
 0.056 -0.026 0.052 0.054 -0.009 0.054 0.021 0.045 
School 0.116 0.030 0.115 -0.060 -0.027 -0.020 0.004 0.068 
 (1.113) (0.301) (1.224) (-0.563) (-0.257) (-0.205) (0.034) (0.595) 
 0.029 0.009 0.037 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006 0.001 0.024 
Retired 0.057 0.021 -0.026 0.119 0.051 -0.011 -0.015 -0.128 
 (0.603) (0.237) (-0.295) (1.242) (0.557) (-0.121) (-0.139) (-1.157) 
 0.014 0.006 -0.008 0.030 0.015 -0.003 -0.005 -0.042 
Home 0.125 0.054 0.065 -0.062 -0.018 -0.039 0.027 -0.009 
 (1.218) (0.538) (0.702) (-0.533) (-0.166) (-0.378) (0.239) (-0.080) 
 0.032 0.015 0.020 -0.015 -0.005 -0.012 0.009 -0.003 
Self-employed 0.047 -0.009 0.036 0.059 -0.031 0.057 0.108 -0.002 
 (0.542) (-0.107) (0.435) (0.655) (-0.342) (0.665) (1.057) (-0.021) 
 0.012 -0.003 0.011 0.015 -0.009 0.018 0.038 -0.001 
Formal education till age        
16 to 19 yrs 0.082 0.057 0.101 0.011 0.077 0.060 0.039 0.016 
 (1.142) (0.839) (1.544) (0.147) (1.078) (0.874) (0.482) (0.190) 
 0.020 0.016 0.032 0.003 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.005 
>= 19 yrs 0.322*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.224*** 0.188** 0.153** 0.151* 0.183** 
 (4.297) (2.707) (2.805) (2.853) (2.480) (2.086) (1.723) (2.054) 
 0.081 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.055 0.049 0.052 0.062 
Income quartiles        
Relative income 0.139*** 0.121*** 0.085*** 0.128*** 0.115*** 0.124*** 0.051* 0.074** 
 (5.279) (4.865) (3.600) (4.616) (4.280) (4.898) (1.731) (2.478) 
 0.034 0.034 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.018 0.025 
Political attitudes        
Ideological 
preferences 
0.051* 0.055* 0.062** 0.092*** 0.052* 0.073** 0.053 0.057 
(1.701) (1.923) (2.217) (2.889) (1.693) (2.486) (1.520) (1.586) 
 0.012 0.016 0.019 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.019 
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Attitudes towards globalization       
Globalization: less 
armed conflicts 
0.004 0.039 0.089*      
(0.086) (0.768) (1.830)      
0.001 0.011 0.028      
Globalization: global 
market 
0.044 0.081 0.130**      
(0.727) (1.385) (2.295)      
 0.011 0.023 0.039      
Globalization: 
economic EU 
presence 
0.110* 0.090 0.111**      
(1.863) (1.559) (2.052)      
0.026 0.025 0.034      
Globalization: product 
markets 
0.165** 0.191*** 0.164***      
(2.521) (3.103) (2.796)      
 0.039 0.052 0.050      
Globalization: product 
variety 
0.029 0.054 0.046      
(0.390) (0.771) (0.690)      
 0.007 0.015 0.014      
Globalization: lower 
product 
prices 
0.060 -0.003 0.110**      
(1.124) (-0.058) (2.232)      
0.015 -0.001 0.034      
Globalization: 
business  
opportunity 
0.038 0.041 -0.006      
(0.737) (0.819) (-0.117)      
0.009 0.012 -0.002      
Globalization: food 
control problem 
-0.135** -0.056 -0.029      
(-2.514) (-1.063) (-0.566)      
-0.034 -0.016 -0.009      
Globalization: large 
company 
power 
0.053 0.032 0.073      
(0.856) (0.520) (1.254)      
0.013 0.009 0.022      
Globalization: no 
government 
control 
-0.009 -0.041 -0.128***      
(-0.167) (-0.811) (-2.649)      
-0.002 -0.012 -0.040      
Globalization: public 
service 
privatized 
   0.034 0.027 0.047   
   (0.621) (0.508) (0.943)   
   0.008 0.008 0.015   
Globalization: job  
opportunities 
   0.320*** 0.281*** 0.172***   
   (4.650) (4.363) (2.850)   
   0.072 0.076 0.052   
Globalization: risk 
losing jobs 
   -0.008 -0.110** -0.108**   
   (-0.143) (-2.041) (-2.088)   
    -0.002 -0.032 -0.034   
Globalization: 
developing  
countries 
   -0.009 -0.018 0.063   
   (-0.170) (-0.339) (1.275)   
   -0.002 -0.005 0.020   
Globalization: 
immigration  
problem 
   -0.098* -0.070 -0.071   
   (-1.773) (-1.315) (-1.388)   
   -0.024 -0.020 -0.022   
Globalization: rich 
and poor gap 
   -0.089 -0.007 -0.068   
   (-1.486) (-0.119) (-1.219)   
   -0.022 -0.002 -0.022   
Globalization: travel 
easier 
   -0.028 0.082 0.133**   
   (-0.388) (1.154) (1.971)   
    -0.007 0.023 0.040   
Globalization: 
uniform world 
   -0.103** -0.111** -0.141***   
   (-1.965) (-2.190) (-2.884)   
    -0.025 -0.032 -0.044   
Globalization:  
environment problems 
   0.011 -0.062 -0.009   
   (0.199) (-1.129) (-0.164)   
   0.003 -0.018 -0.003   
Globalization: quality 
of life 
   0.119** 0.108** 0.028   
   (2.271) (2.154) (0.568)   
   0.029 0.031 0.009   
WTO - known       0.177***  
       (6.896)  
       0.061  
WTO: guarantees 
liberali-zation benefit 
      0.073  
      (1.127)  
      0.025  
WTO: ensures fair 
competition rules 
      0.068  
      (1.097)  
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       0.023  
WTO: EU is well  
represented 
      0.181**  
      (2.459)  
      0.060  
WTO: good 
reputation 
      0.442***  
      (5.983)  
       0.143  
WTO: referee of trade 
disputes 
       -0.026 
       (-0.373) 
       -0.009 
WTO: works 
transparent 
       0.057 
       (0.843) 
        0.019 
WTO: is democratic        0.137* 
       (1.909) 
        0.046 
WTO: defending 
interests vs. USA 
 
       0.092 
       (1.460) 
       0.031 
WTO: is necessary        0.575*** 
       (6.234) 
        0.171 
Pseudo R^2 0.095 0.133 0.100 0.094 0.135 0.092 0.121 0.089 
Observations 4426 4426 4426 4029 4029 4029 2710 2581 
a
 Marginal effects at mean values of explanatory variables are in italics, z-statistics are in parentheses. b Hypotheses tests are based on 
robust standard errors. c All estimations include country fixed effects. d Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). e Base levels for 
dummy variables: female, single, employed, education until age < 15 years, native (i.e. national language is mother tongue), living in a 
large town. Ideological preferences defined as−1 (left-wing), 0 (center), +1 (right-wing); relative income scaled as 1 (lowest income 
quartile) to 4 (highest quartile). 
 
In addition, we find that trust in three IEOs is influenced by beliefs that globalization leads 
to a dull and uniform world (marginal effect of -2.5% to -4.4%) and that globalization 
increases opportunities on the job market (marginal effect of 5.2% to 7.6%). The fear of 
losing jobs is associated with less trust in the World Bank and WTO, while the belief that 
globalization makes travelling easier translates into more trust in the WTO. Finally, those 
who agree that globalization increases the quality of life are more likely to trust the IMF and 
the World Bank by 2.9% and 3.3%, respectively. It should also be noted that opinions on the 
following statements regarding globalization’s consequences have no effect on trust in any 
of the three IEOs: Larger product variety, more business opportunities, more power for large 
firms, privatization of public services, poor countries catching up with rich countries, and 
environmental problems.  
 Models 13 and 14 focus on respondents’ trust in the WTO and show first of all that 
people who know the WTO better are more likely to trust this organization. This is in line 
with Ehrmann et al. (2010) and Kalthenthaler et al. (2010) who present a similar result with 
regard to the ECB. More importantly, the beliefs that the EU is well-presented in the WTO, 
that the WTO has a good reputation, and that the WTO is a democratic and necessary 
institution are positively associated with a higher likelihood of trust in the WTO. The 
marginal effects for the WTO’s good reputation and of the attitude that the WTO is a 
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necessary institution amount to comparatively high values of 14.3% and 17.1%, 
respectively. To summarize, we cannot reject hypotheses 2 and 3. 
  
Table 3 Macroeconomic determinants of trust in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, probit estimations 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Dependent variable Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Macroeconomic factors       
KOF-globalization index 0.046*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 
 
(2.654) (3.118) (3.581) (4.290) (4.160) (4.688) 
 
0.010 0.017 0.017 0.009 0.016 0.018 
Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.009 -0.033 0.002 -0.010 -0.036* 
 
(0.027) (-0.377) (-1.591) (0.108) (-0.548) (-1.912) 
 
0.000 -0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 
Inflation rate -0.009 -0.090 -0.080 0.000 -0.082 -0.087* 
 
(-0.144) (-1.245) (-1.406) (0.005) (-1.220) (-1.844) 
 
-0.002 -0.024 -0.023 0.000 -0.021 -0.025 
Demographic factors yes yes yes yes yes yes 
International background yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Marital status yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Employment status yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Formal education till age yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Income quartiles yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Ideological preferences yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Political interest no no no yes yes yes 
Use of news sources no no no yes yes yes 
News interests no no no yes yes yes 
Area of residence no no no yes yes yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.069 0.073 0.069 0.095 0.087 0.085 
Observations 9014 9014 9014 8458 8458 8458 
a
 Marginal effects at mean values of explanatory variables are in italics, z-statistics are in parentheses. b Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 
1% (***). c Base levels for dummy variables: female, single, employed, education until age < 15 years, native (i.e. national language is 
mother tongue), living in a large town. Ideological preferences defined as−1 (left-wing), 0 (center), +1 (right-wing); relative income scaled 
as 1 (lowest income quartile) to 4 (highest quartile). d Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. 
 
Table 3 eventually tests the validity of hypotheses 4 and 5 and focuses on the relevance of 
macroeconomic determinants for individual trust in the three IEOs. In order to save space, 
the table does not display the coefficients, z-statistics and marginal effects for the variables 
at the individual-level. Models 15 to 17 include only those variables at the individual level 
for which there are no missing observations, while models 16 to 18 include 15 additional 
variables. This is the same structure that we used in table 1. Moreover, since the data has 
been collected in one year only, we were forced to drop the country fixed effects and are 
essentially estimating a pooled sample. However, we do employ country-clustered standard 
errors to take into account country-specific influences. 
 Models 15 to 20 provide strong evidence that people who live in more economically, 
socially, and politically integrated countries are more likely to express trust in international 
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organizations. In fact, an increase in the KOF-index by 1 point leads to an increase in the 
likelihood of trusting the three IEOs by about 1% to 2%. Second, we find that only 
institutional trust in the WTO is influenced by the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, 
where the coefficients are only significant at the 10% level. For the other two IEOs, there is 
no indication that the state of the economy matters for trust in international organizations. 
An explanation may be that people are more likely to blame national institutions for 
deteriorations in the macroeconomic development in a certain country. To summarize, we 
reject hypothesis 4, while we cannot reject hypothesis 5. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to test the robustness of the results presented in section 4.1, we conduct a robustness 
check that addresses a potential measurement problem with regard to the dependent 
variables used in tables 1 to 3. Respondents were asked to select those institutions that they 
trust most to get the effects of globalization under control. Hence, for instance if an 
individual only names the IMF and none of the other 14 organizations, this expresses a 
relatively higher extent of trust for this particular institution than if this individual mentioned 
all 15 institutions (see section 3.1 for a complete list of these institutions).  
Therefore, we divided the 0 or 1 indicating trust in a particular IEO by the total 
number of institutions that were mentioned. Hence, the dependent variable is now for each 
respondent any number between 0 and 1.20 For this reason, these estimations are not 
conducted with the binary probit estimator but with an OLS estimator. With regard to the 
explanatory variables, the models in table 4 are equivalent to those in table 2. Therefore we 
have numbered the models accordingly from 7b to 14b. 
 First, it should be noted that the coefficients for the demographic factors, 
international background, marital and employment status, relative income, and political 
preferences are quite similar to those in tables 1 and 2, even though the level of significance 
is on average lower. A similar statement can be made with regard to the coefficients for 
respondents’ attitudes towards globalization and their opinions regarding the WTO. 
 For brevity, we will only discuss in what ways the results differ from the previous 
estimations. First, the belief that globalization contributes to peace is not correlated anymore 
with trust in the WTO. The same is true with regard to the belief that globalization 
                                                 
20
 Note that 1,011 of 9,014 respondents do not tend to trust any of the 14 institutions. Since it is not possible 
to divide by 0, we assigned the value 0 to these cases. 
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guarantees the EU greater economic presence in the world and trust in the IMF and WTO. 
People who hold the view that globalization provides more opportunities for national 
products on world markets only tend to trust the World Bank more, but not the other two 
IEOs. Moreover, the opinion that globalization cannot be controlled by national 
governments does not reduce trust in the WTO as it did in table 2. 
 
Table 4 Robustness check: Rescaled dependent variables, OLS estimations 
 Model 
7b 
Model 
8b 
Model 
9b 
Model 
10b 
Model 
11b 
Model 
12b 
Model 
13b 
Model 
14b 
Dependent variable Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
IMF 
Trust in 
World Bank 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
WTO 
Trust in 
WTO 
Demographic factors        
Male 0.004 0.012*** 0.006 0.005 0.010** 0.001 -0.007 0.002 
 (1.326) (2.954) (1.240) (1.563) (2.329) (0.232) (-0.969) (0.281) 
Age 0.001 0.002** -0.001 0.000 0.002** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.404) (2.100) (-1.171) (0.040) (2.089) (-1.621) (-0.703) (-0.648) 
Age^2 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.863) (-1.988) (1.008) (0.037) (-1.686) (1.262) (0.479) (0.443) 
International background        
Foreigner -0.014** -0.035*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.025*** -0.006 0.001 -0.006 
 (-2.209) (-4.878) (-0.673) (-1.298) (-2.641) (-0.392) (0.051) (-0.263) 
Foreign languages 0.003* 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.003 0.001 
(1.703) (2.025) (0.743) (0.873) (1.818) (0.623) (0.803) (0.200) 
Marital status         
Married -0.004 -0.007 0.012* -0.007 -0.011* 0.001 0.012 0.005 
 (-0.856) (-1.183) (1.772) (-1.375) (-1.739) (0.146) (1.265) (0.565) 
Divorced -0.002 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
 (-0.219) (0.416) (-0.696) (0.207) (0.048) (0.133) (-0.126) (-0.439) 
Separated -0.010 0.007 0.011 -0.017 -0.009 -0.007 0.005 -0.021 
 (-0.795) (0.438) (0.742) (-1.411) (-0.547) (-0.419) (0.214) (-1.110) 
Widowed -0.010 -0.012 0.019 -0.011 -0.013 0.015 0.014 0.014 
 (-1.197) (-1.312) (1.438) (-1.320) (-1.251) (1.060) (0.724) (0.686) 
Employment status        
Unemployed 0.013 -0.011 0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.017 -0.014 
 (1.585) (-1.235) (0.086) (1.087) (-0.687) (0.116) (-1.549) (-1.188) 
School 0.011 -0.003 0.012 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 (1.372) (-0.387) (1.059) (0.185) (-0.382) (-0.474) (-0.525) (-0.340) 
Retired 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.006 -0.011 
 (0.831) (0.376) (0.121) (1.359) (0.126) (0.629) (0.392) (-0.831) 
Home 0.005 -0.000 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.920) (-0.017) (0.971) (-0.211) (-0.351) (-0.026) (0.128) (-0.249) 
Self-employed 0.011 -0.004 0.004 0.014* -0.001 0.011 0.003 -0.014 
 (1.508) (-0.512) (0.479) (1.873) (-0.094) (1.096) (0.264) (-1.290) 
Formal education till age       
16 to 19 yrs 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.781) (0.134) (0.236) (-0.516) (1.020) (-0.293) (0.135) (-0.457) 
>= 19 yrs 0.021*** 0.011* 0.008 0.013** 0.012* 0.005 0.008 0.011 
 (4.011) (1.876) (0.940) (2.372) (1.796) (0.536) (0.691) (0.962) 
Income quartiles        
Relative income 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.010*** 
 (4.860) (3.731) (2.698) (4.701) (3.383) (3.984) (0.933) (2.634) 
Political attitudes        
Ideological 
preferences 
0.005** 0.006** 0.005 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.002 0.002 
(2.503) (2.136) (1.598) (3.273) (2.390) (2.230) (0.415) (0.496) 
Attitudes towards globalization       
Globalization: less 
armed conflicts  
-0.000 0.000 0.002      
(-0.068) (0.023) (0.391)      
Globalization: global 
market 
0.004 0.002 0.012**      
(1.009) (0.321) (2.083)      
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Globalization: 
economic EU 
presence 
0.002 0.004 0.001      
(0.573) (0.682) (0.165)      
Globalization: product 
markets 
0.007 0.010* 0.010      
(1.496) (1.938) (1.617)      
Globalization: product 
variety 
0.002 0.006 0.006      
(0.512) (1.152) (0.935)      
Globalization: lower 
product prices 
0.002 -0.002 0.012**      
(0.530) (-0.506) (2.350)      
Globalization: 
business  
opportunity 
0.000 0.001 -0.004      
(0.062) (0.196) (-0.800)      
Globalization: food 
control problem 
-0.008** -0.005 -0.003      
(-2.114) (-1.016) (-0.532)      
Globalization: large 
company power 
-0.002 -0.003 0.003      
(-0.481) (-0.577) (0.530)      
Globalization: no  
government control 
0.003 0.001 -0.004      
(0.759) (0.207) (-0.679)      
Globalization: public 
service privatized 
   0.001 -0.006 0.001   
   (0.235) (-1.232) (0.116)   
Globalization: job     0.013*** 0.010* 0.007   
opportunities    (3.404) (1.896) (1.027)   
Globalization: risk 
losing jobs 
   0.001 -0.008* -0.007   
   (0.145) (-1.650) (-1.177)   
Globalization: 
developing countries 
   0.000 -0.005 0.006   
   (0.042) (-0.943) (1.056)   
Globalization: 
immigration  
problem 
   -0.006* -0.004 -0.006   
   (-1.717) (-0.850) (-1.100)   
Globalization: rich 
and poor gap 
   -0.005 0.004 -0.001   
   (-1.350) (0.836) (-0.090)   
Globalization: travel 
easier 
   -0.001 0.007 0.011   
   (-0.231) (1.168) (1.559)   
Globalization: 
uniform world 
   -0.001 -0.004 -0.012**   
   (-0.435) (-0.855) (-2.163)   
Globalization:  
environment problems 
   0.000 -0.004 -0.001   
   (0.015) (-0.862) (-0.138)   
Globalization: quality 
of life 
   0.003 0.005 -0.006   
   (0.804) (1.130) (-1.218)   
WTO - known       0.013***  
       (4.575)  
WTO: guarantees        -0.008  
liberalization benefit       (-0.918)  
WTO: ensures fair 
competition rules 
      0.012  
      (1.521)  
WTO: EU is well        0.010  
represented       (1.157)  
WTO: good 
reputation 
      0.046***  
      (5.665)  
WTO: referee of trade 
disputes 
       0.001 
       (0.127) 
WTO: works 
transparent 
       0.001 
       (0.076) 
WTO: is democratic        0.012 
       (1.362) 
WTO: defending 
interests vs. USA 
       0.002 
       (0.320) 
WTO: is necessary        0.047*** 
       (5.802) 
R^2 0.055 0.085 0.058 0.055 0.086 0.057 0.075 0.056 
Observations 4426 4426 4426 4029 4029 4029 2710 2581 
a
 t-statistics are in parentheses. b Hypotheses tests are based on robust standard errors. c All estimations include country fixed effects. d 
Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). e Base levels for dummy variables: female, single, employed, education until age < 15 years, 
native (i.e. national language is mother tongue), living in a large town. Ideological preferences defined as−1 (left-wing), 0 (center), +1 
(right-wing); relative income scaled as 1 (lowest income quartile) to 4 (highest quartile).  
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The results for models 10b to 12b also differ in some respects from those for models 10 to 
12. The beliefs that global economic integration provides interesting job opportunities in 
other countries and that globalization increases the risk of people losing their jobs does not 
influence trust in the WTO. In addition, in table 4 people who believe that globalization 
facilitates travelling are not more likely to trust the WTO, while the belief that globalization 
leads to a duller, more uniform world is irrelevant for trust in the IMF and World Bank. 
Finally, it appears that the belief that globalization contributes to a higher quality of life is 
not relevant anymore for trust in the IMF and the World Bank as it was in table 2. 
 From models 13b and 14b, we can infer that the views that the EU is well-
represented in the WTO and that the WTO is democratic do not have an influence on the 
extent of trust in the WTO. To conclude, the rescaling of the dependent variable has not 
affected our estimation results to a large degree, even though in general some coefficients 
have become insignificant. For a sizable number of determinants, we continue to find 
significant results.  
 
5 Concluding remarks 
The objective of this study has been to investigate what drives people’s trust in three IEOs: 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. This is a question that has so far not been 
addressed in any existing study in the literature. The empirical analysis is based on a 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in April/May 2001, which includes survey data for 9,014 
respondents across the EU-15 countries. In addition to a number of individual characteristics 
and macroeconomic variables that have been shown in the existing literature to affect either 
social trust, international trust or trust in other international organizations, we add some 
additional individual characteristics, about thirty measures for respondents’ attitudes 
towards globalization and the WTO in particular. 
The estimation results that individual characteristics (gender, international 
background, formal education level, income level, ideological preferences, interest in 
politics, exposure to media, interest in specific news domains) as well as the extent of 
globalization matter for trust in the IEOs. On the other hand, the state of the economy only 
has an influence on trust in the WTO, but is insignificant with regard to trust in the IMF and 
the World Bank. This may be an indication that people would rather blame national 
institutions for macroeconomic distortions. Moreover, people seem to project positive as 
well as negative attitudes towards globalization to their level of trust in the three IEOs. 
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Finally, trust in the WTO grows with knowledge about the WTO and is shaped by beliefs 
that the EU is well-represented in the WTO, that the WTO has a good reputation, and that 
the WTO is a democratic and necessary institution.  
 The question that arises finally is what international bureaucrats can do in order to 
increase citizens’ trust in international organizations, which should ultimately strengthen the 
legitimacy of these institutions. First of all, as has been emphasized by Ehrmann et al. 
(2010) in the context of the ECB, it is recommendable for IEOs to inform people better 
about their objectives and the policies that they pursue. Second, the perception that an 
institution is democratic has a positive influence on trust in the case of the WTO. If this 
applies to other international organizations as well, one may wonder whether - as discussed 
by Frey and Stutzer (2006a,b) and Tullock (2006) - citizens should be more strongly 
involved in the determination of ground rules and policy formulations of IEOs.  
 
Appendix 
Table 5 Survey questions of Eurobarometer 55.1 included in regressions 
Variable Survey Question in Eurobarometer 55.1 
Trust in IMF, World Bank, WTO 
Globalization is a general opening up of all economies, which leads to the 
creation of a truly world-wide market. From the following list, who do you 
trust most to get the effects of globalization under control? 0 Not mentioned, 1 
Mentioned 
Political discussions – frequency When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1)? 
Political discussions – convince friends When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your 
friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? 
1 Often, 2 From time to time, 3 Rarely, 4 Never 
Television use – news About how often do you...watch the news on television? 1 Everyday, 2 Several 
times a week, 3 Once or twice a week, 4 Less often, 5 Never 
Daily newspapers use – news About how often do you...read the news in daily papers? 1 Everyday, 2 
Several times a week, 3 Once or twice a week, 4 Less often, 5 Never 
Radio use – news About how often do you listen to the news on the radio? 1 Everyday, 2 Several 
times a week, 3 Once or twice a week, 4 Less often, 5 Never 
 In general, do you pay attention to news about each of the following? 1 A lot 
of attention, 2 A little attention, 3 No attention at all 
Attention to news: politics Politics 
Attention to news: social issues Social issues such as education, health care, poverty, etc. 
Attention to news: European Union European Union 
Attention to news: economy The economy 
Attention to news: sport Sport 
Attention to news: environment The environment 
Attention to news: International affairs Foreign policy / international affairs 
Attention to news: culture Culture 
 
 
The media often talk about globalization. Do you tend to agree (1) or tend to 
disagree (0) with each of the following statements?  Globalization...  
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Globalization: less armed conflicts 
Globalization: global market 
Contributes to eliminating armed conflicts around the world 
Creates a truly global market 
Globalization: economic EU presence Guarantees the European Union greater economic presence in the world 
Globalization: product markets Provides more opportunities for national products on world markets 
Globalization: product variety Increases the variety of products  
Globalization: lower product prices Cuts the prices of products and services through increased competition 
Globalization: business opportunity Gives small and medium sized businesses an opportunity to grow much faster 
Globalization: food control problem Makes it more difficult to control the quality of food products  
Globalization: large company power Leads to power being concentrated in large companies, at the expense of 
others 
Globalization: no government control Cannot be controlled by governments 
Globalization: public service privatized Leads to the privatization of public services in Europe 
Globalization: job opportunities Gives us interesting job opportunities in other countries 
Globalization: risk losing jobs Increases the risk of people losing their jobs 
Globalization: developing countries Gives developing countries the opportunity to reduce the gap between 
themselves and developed countries 
Globalization: immigration problem Leads to an uncontrollable increase in immigration 
Globalization: rich and poor gap Increases the gap between the rich and the poor 
Globalization: travel easier Makes it easier to travel 
Globalization: uniform world Leads to a duller and more uniform world 
Globalization: environment problems Increases global environmental problems 
Globalization: quality of life Provides a better personal quality of life 
WTO – known Before this interview, had you heard of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)? 5 Yes, I know what the WTO is and what it does, 4 Yes, but I only 
know a little about it, 3 Yes, but I only know the name, 2 Yes, other,  1,  No, 
not heard of 
 
 
 
 
 
WTO: guarantees liberalization benefit 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the only international organisation 
dealing with rules regulating trade between countries. It has 140 member 
countries. Its goal is to help exporters, and importers of goods and services to 
conduct their business. Do you think that...? Yes (1), No (0) 
WTO guarantees that people benefit from liberalisation 
WTO: ensures fair competition rules WTO has enough power to ensure that the rules of fair competition are 
respected 
WTO: EU is well represented The European Union is well represented within the WTO 
WTO: good reputation WTO has a good reputation 
WTO: referee of trade disputes WTO is an impartial referee of trade disputes between states 
WTO: works transparent The workings of the WTO are transparent 
WTO: is democratic WTO is democratic 
WTO: defending interests vs. USA There is a country or group of countries strong enough to defend their 
interests in the WTO against the United States 
WTO: is necessary WTO is necessary 
 
 
Table 6 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations 
Trust in IMF 0.146 0.353 0  1  9014 
Trust in World Bank 0.2  0.4  0  1  9014 
Trust in WTO 0.224 0.417 0  1  9014 
Male 0.5  0.5  0  1  9014 
Age 45.762 17.215 15  99  9014 
Foreigner 0.094 0.292 0  1  9014 
Foreign languages 0.936 1.016 0  7  9014 
Married 0.622 0.485 0  1  9014 
Divorced 0.067 0.25  0  1  9014 
Separated 0.015 0.121 0  1  9014 
Widowed 0.088 0.283 0  1  9014 
Unemployed 0.055 0.229 0  1  9014 
School 0.075 0.263 0  1  9014 
Retired 0.234 0.423 0  1  9014 
Home 0.095 0.294 0  1  9014 
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Self-employed 0.073 0.261 0  1  9014 
Education till 16-19 yrs of age 0.393 0.488 0  1  9014 
Education till >= 19 yrs of age 0.345 0.476 0  1  9014 
Income quartile 2.566 1.108 1  4  9014 
Ideological preferences -0.101  0.751 -1  1  9014 
Political discussions – frequency 1.861 0.622 1  3  8949 
Political discussions – convince friends 2.45  0.957 1  4  8907 
Television use – news 4.569 0.817 1  5  8999 
Daily newspapers use – news 3.833 1.393 1  5  8987 
Radio use – news 3.825 1.406 1  5  8978 
Attention to news: politics 2.171 0.674 1  3  8975 
Attention to news: social issues 2.544 0.593 1  3  8973 
Attention to news: European Union 1.984 0.692 1  3  8929 
Attention to news: economy 2.207 0.716 1  3  8945 
Attention to news: sport 2.074 0.813 1  3  8968 
Attention to news: environment 2.4  0.638 1  3  8949 
Attention to news: International affairs 2.041 0.722 1  3  8931 
Attention to news: culture 2.149 0.700 1  3  8925 
Rural area or village 0.305 0.461 0  1  8932 
Small-/medium-sized town 0.416 0.493 0  1  8932 
Globalization: less armed conflicts 0.562 0.496 0  1  7300 
Globalization: global market 0.741 0.438 0  1  7339 
Globalization: economic EU presence 0.715 0.451 0  1  7172 
Globalization: product markets 0.737 0.44  0  1  7635 
Globalization: product variety 0.862 0.344 0  1  7939 
Globalization: lower product prices 0.629 0.483 0  1  7501 
Globalization: business opportunity 0.497 0.5  0  1  7059 
Globalization: food control problem 0.74  0.439 0  1  7660 
Globalization: large company power 0.823 0.382 0  1  7393 
Globalization: no government control 0.678 0.467 0  1  7111 
Globalization: public service privatized 0.702 0.457 0  1  6362 
Globalization: job opportunities 0.765 0.424 0  1  7509 
Globalization: risk losing jobs 0.6  0.49  0  1  7316 
Globalization: developing countries 0.591 0.492 0  1  7176 
Globalization: immigration problem 0.655 0.475 0  1  7414 
Globalization: rich and poor gap 0.707 0.455 0  1  7429 
Globalization: travel easier 0.859 0.348 0  1  7920 
Globalization: uniform world 0.426 0.495 0  1  7209 
Globalization: environment problems 0.663 0.473 0  1  7332 
Globalization: quality of life 0.402 0.49  0  1  6705 
WTO - known 2.915 1.4  1  5  8826 
WTO: guarantees liberalization benefit 0.592 0.491 0  1  5408 
WTO: ensures fair competition rules 0.518 0.5  0  1  5484 
WTO: EU is well represented 0.769 0.421 0  1  4321 
WTO: good reputation 0.708 0.455 0  1  4448 
WTO: referee of trade disputes 0.642 0.479 0  1  4756 
WTO: works transparent 0.409 0.492 0  1  4180 
WTO: is democratic 0.646 0.478 0  1  4369 
WTO: defending interests vs. USA 0.62  0.486 0  1  4770 
WTO: is necessary 0.871 0.335 0  1  5705 
KOF-globalization index 86.461 3.891 78.724 92.394 9014 
Unemployment rate 6.46  2.417 2.518 10.784 9014 
Inflation rate 2.706 0.919 1.236 4.876 9014 
Rescaled trust in IMF 0.035 0.099 0  1  9014 
Rescaled trust in World Bank 0.054 0.132 0  1  9014 
Rescaled trust in WTO 0.067 0.156 0  1  9014 
a
 Base levels for dummy variables: female, single, employed, education until age < 15 years, native (i.e. national language is mother 
tongue), living in a large town. b In the sample there is indeed one individual aged 99 years.  
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